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it exists is obviously in some sense a product of a larger whole; hence the principles by which it successfully interprets that whole must be in some way prefigured in the reality of the whole." This is a somewhat vague statement; and I am afraid it involves a *petitio principii*. If we knew that our principles successfully interpreted the whole, it would seem that we must already know the whole.

Mr. Whittaker's book is certainly suggestive and instructive. Some of its historical references are particularly valuable. But it seems to me to be lacking in thoroughness. The criticisms that I have ventured to make have reference to its main contentions; but there are also some minor issues on which objections might be raised. Thus, on p. 105, Mr. Whittaker says of the "logical persecutor" that "professedly regarding belief in what he holds for truth as the highest thing in himself, he makes it his aim systematically to repress the beliefs of others." But surely the logical persecutor does not value his beliefs merely as beliefs, but as truth. He attacks the beliefs of others, not because they differ from his, but because he regards them as wrong and pernicious. It is to be feared that Mr. Whittaker will not convert either the persecutor or the Prussian.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF WANG YANG-MING. Translated from the Chinese by Frederick Goodrich Henke, Ph.D., former Professor of Psychology and Philosophy in the University of Nanking. With an Introduction by Professor James H. Tufts of the University of Chicago. Open Court Publishing Company. Pp. xvii, 512.

In this volume English students of philosophy are introduced for the first time to one of the most influential Chinese thinkers. It is doubtful whether they knew him in even the most indirect way before the appearance of Dr. Henke's presentation of his work, and they are to be congratulated upon their receipt of such a contribution as is rendered in this faithful translation.

The fundamental doctrines of Wang Yang-Ming which have had the greatest influence upon Chinese students for generations since his time are his teachings of the unity of reality and ex-

perience, and that of knowledge and action, of theory and practice. That such teachings did exist in China in the middle of the sixteenth century, and that this most practical of the Eastern philosophers had many points in common with his Western contemporary, the author of the Novum Organum, is evidence of the truth in Professor Tufts' phrase in his introduction to this volume —"Seekers for truth speak a common language."

The metaphysical as well as the psychological foundation of the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming is found in the following words of his own: "Reality is one; the crystallization of it is called nature, and the axis of this crystallization is called mind. The activity of this axis is called meaning or purpose; the distinctness of the activity is called knowledge; the reaction of the distinctness is called thing." (Not contained in the portion translated. Cf. pp. 81, 83, of the translation.) Thus it follows that the investigation of things is the investigation of the reaction of the activities of the mind, and the attainment of knowledge is the achievement of the distinctness of the activities of the mind and nothing more.

Mind, therefore, according to Wang Yang-Ming, is the embodiment of the laws of the universe on the one hand, and the dynamic, creative activity on the other. It is neither the *tabula rasa* nor the reflective mirror as Locke or Leibniz would have it but a constructive function that is everlastingly arranging and rearranging, creating and recreating its objects to suit its purposes. "It has no structure: It uses the right and wrong influences of heaven, earth, and things as structure." Activity, therefore, is the rank and file of life.

As a logical outcome of this doctrine we have the following teachings:

1. As the mind is the axis of the crystallization of the laws of the universe, intuitive knowledge is native and equal in each individual. Even strangled by his selfish ends and passions, this native knowledge still persists and manages to appear when these passions are subdued or harmonized. This persistence of the intuitive knowledge is called the intuitive faculty. Virtue consists in the development of this faculty.

2. The revolutionary theory that the individual is his own authority. Experience is the only guidance of life. One only has to go to his own inner self to find the laws of the universe.

He can never go beyond his experience and expect to find truth. No past criterion can serve as his standard except his own.

Duty, too, must be found in one's own mind. "He who understands the original nature of his mind thereby understands the path of duty, for the two cannot be distinguished."

3. The unity of knowledge and action. "I say that the virtuous man already knows that knowledge and practice are a unity." "Knowledge is the beginning of action; action the fruition of knowledge. There is no practice abstracted from theory, neither is there theory abstracted from practice." Philosophy, therefore, is the warp and woof of conduct, and conduct the bone and marrow of philosophy.

4. Good and evil are relative and are late conceptions. When the intuitive faculty develops along its natural course unhampered by the selfish feelings and passions we call it good. But if the development of this faculty is smeared by the blot of the passions, it is evil. The end of human conduct, therefore, is to bring all these passions and feelings to "a state of perfect equilibrum and harmony," in order to maintain a state of tranquility in which the intuitive faculty can have a free play in the contemplation of the laws of the universe. And when this state is reached, good and evil disappear.

These are the main points in the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming. Dr. Henke, in his Preface, classified Wang Yang-Ming as "an idealist of the monistic type." However plausible this may seem in the face of the system as a whole, I cannot help but remark that Wang Yang-Ming is too thoroughgoing and practical to be as consistent as that. He at least opposes the passions and desires to the intuitive knowledge; opposes the worldly ends to the heavenly laws. What place we can assign to these passions and desire in such a system of reality is a serious and baffling question.

Too much credit cannot be given to Dr. Henke for this translation. He not only adds to the Western library of philosophy a volume most valuable in its original but also does this without any predetermined purpose either to prove that the thought of the Orient is inferior to that of the Occident or to solicit followers for him whose work he presents. It is this disinterested interest that enabled him to present a volume which seems to me to be most representative of the original. Textual criticisms may be

made but they will not affect to any extent the main doctrine which Dr. Henke wishes to present.

The volume contains the Biography, the Instructions for Practical Life, Records of Discourses,and the Letters of Wang Yang-Ming. The main teachings can be found in Book I, pp. 47–140. The rest consists of the repetition and elaboration of these teachings.

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SECOND THOUGHT OF AN ECONOMIST. By William Smart, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Glasgow. With a biographical sketch by Thomas Jones, M.A. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1916. Pp. lxxix, 190. Price, 5s. net.

The relation of ethics to economics is often supposed to present a difficult problem, though as it stands it is no more than an elementary matter of analysis. The two sciences discuss different questions, and there is no subordination of one to the other. But an intelligent grasp of the nature of social life demands the presence of both, together with the definite allocation of each to its own province. This is unhappily somewhat rare. The moralist is seldom able to resist the temptation of dictating to the economist: since, being a philosopher, he is accustomed to meddle with just those parts of other people's business that he does not understand.

It seems to me a peculiar tribute to the strength of Smart's mind that he should for so long have kept strictly to his business as an economist, and that when he did at length permit himself to exceed it, he should have done so with so marked an absence of confusion. The influences which had helped to form his mind in its youth—Ruskin and Idealism—had this at least in common that they were on the whole hostile to exact analysis and the discriminating separation of problems. Yet he does recognise that even in asking where the economic life is leading us, we come close to raising a question which is not one of economics, but of something else.

Smart's point of view had some characteristics rather unusual in an economist. For one thing, he thought it more remarkable that there should be wealth to distribute than that the distribution should be extremely unequal. We must first of all remember